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STATE EQUITY CROWDFUNDING AND INVESTOR 
PROTECTION 
Christopher H. Pierce-Wright 
Abstract: Since Kansas enacted the first blue sky law in 1911, securities regulation has 
sought to protect investors from fraud and speculation. Historically, this meant precluding 
substantial numbers of small businesses from raising capital in the form of equity 
investments. In order to facilitate small-business capital formation, in 2012 the federal 
government passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). Although Title III 
of the JOBS Act required the Securities and Exchange Commission to undergo rulemaking to 
allow for small-dollar equity investments, the agency dragged its feet. In the interim, states 
anxious to jumpstart their own economies took the initiative. Legislation has now been 
enacted in over half the states. Although a laudable attempt to make raising capital easier, 
this legislation potentially provides an avenue for fraudulent offerings and significant 
investor losses. This Comment reviews the historical context in which state crowdfunding 
exemptions have been passed and compares enacted state laws to the JOBS Act’s 
requirements. It argues that in order to effectively prevent fraud while enabling small-
business capital formation, states should adopt specific protection measures in their 
crowdfunding laws. These prophylactic measures, including requirements on both issuers and 
intermediaries, as well as protections for investors, promise to better help business while also 
protecting investors. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 5, 2015, the nation’s capital completed its first equity 
crowdfunding campaign.
1
 The offering, set up through the online 
crowdfunding platform EquityEats,
2
 sought to raise $200,000 in thirty 
days for a new restaurant in the District’s Penn Quarter neighborhood.3 
In return for investing between $100 and $10,000, the 339 D.C. residents 
who participated were promised a ten percent interest in the company, a 
portion of the restaurant’s cash flow, and other perks like priority 
reservations and an opportunity to discuss the business with 
                                                     
1. Steven Overly, The City’s First Equity Crowdfunding Campaign Reaches Its Goal, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/the-citys-first-
equity-crowdfunding-campaign-reaches-its-goal/2015/03/05/2116ebbe-c374-11e4-ad5c-
3b8ce89f1b89_story.html [https://perma.cc/MF8K-D7CZ]. 
2. EQUITYEATS, https://www.equityeats.com/ [https://perma.cc/79KE-M9DW] (last visited Mar. 
1, 2015). 
3. Overly, supra note 1. 
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management.
4
 
Small-dollar equity investments, or equity crowdfunding, provide a 
new means through which small business owners can raise the capital 
needed to start and expand their businesses.
5
 Although a small subset of 
the most promising companies can access any number of different 
sources of financing, from venture capital firms
6
 to angel investors,
7
 
most have to rely on other sources like traditional bank loans or an 
owner’s personal savings.8 Slowly, those traditional constraints have 
loosened as different means of financing become available. Equity 
crowdfunding is one of these means, made available to small businesses 
by states and, more recently, the federal government to facilitate 
investment in small businesses. 
Until recently, small businesses had been all but prohibited from 
raising money through small-dollar equity investments. The goals of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commission)—to 
protect investors, maintain efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
formation
9—are inherently at odds. That conflict has disproportionately 
                                                     
4. J.D. Alois, Prequel, the First DC Equity Crowdfunding Offer, Closes Fully Funded, 
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2015, 5:07 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/03/63878-
prequel-the-first-dc-equity-crowdfunding-offer-closes-fully-funded/ [https://perma.cc/8A34-GL8Y]. 
5. Online crowdfunded investing, made most popular through online platforms like Kickstarter 
and Indiegogo, has been around since ArtistShare began in 2003. DAVID M. FREEDMAN & 
MATTHEW R. NUTTING, EQUITY CROWDFUNDING FOR INVESTORS: A GUIDE TO RISKS, RETURNS, 
REGULATIONS, FUNDING PORTALS, DUE DILIGENCE, AND DEAL TERMS (2015). The fundraising 
conducted on these earlier platforms differs from equity crowdfunding. Because a non-equity 
“offering” is not registered, it cannot provide investors with anything defined as a “security” by 
state or federal law. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 30–32 (2012) (distinguishing “donation” and “reward” models of 
crowdfunding, which do not involve the sale of a security, from “equity” crowdfunding, which 
does). The earliest crowdfunding platforms allowed businesses to offer “perks,” like a product. See, 
e.g., How It Works, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/how-it-works. Because none of these 
websites offer equity interests, they are not subject to securities regulation. See infra notes 167–69 
and accompanying text. 
6. See Dileep Rao, Why 99.95% of Entrepreneurs Should Stop Wasting Time Seeking Venture 
Capital, FORBES (July 22, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dileeprao/2013/07/ 
22/why-99-95-of-entrepreneurs-should-stop-wasting-time-seeking-venture-capital/ 
[https://perma.cc/YV3Q-32WN] (discussing the limited availability of venture capital financing for 
the substantial majority of small businesses). 
7. See Tanya Prive, Angel Investors: How the Rich Invest, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2013, 9:27 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2013/03/12/angels-investors-how-the-rich-invest/ 
[https://perma.cc/CMP4-UZ2W] (“Angel investors invest their own money when participating in 
startup fundraising rounds, where the typical amount raised ranges from $150,000 to $2,000,000.”). 
8. Catherine Clifford, Top Sources of Small-Business Financing in 2012, ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 2, 
2012), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/222540 [https://perma.cc/D36L-HCFV]. 
9. What We Do, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
whatwedo.shtml#.VNEgd_54rN8 [https://perma.cc/4K6G-ZQMC] (last modified June 10, 2013). 
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burdened small businesses.
10
 Because securities regulators chose 
disclosure as the primary method of investor protection, the resulting 
fixed costs are substantial and cost prohibitive for many businesses 
interested in accessing the public securities markets.
11
 During the 
summer of 2011, the regulation landscape began to change when Kansas 
passed the first equity crowdfunding law.
12
 That law was intended to 
match local businesses with investors who “wanted to make a profit, but 
[who] also wanted to support the business in their town.”13 That single 
state exemption was followed shortly by the passage of the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act),
14
 which President Obama signed 
into law in April of 2012.
15
 Title III of the JOBS Act was intended to 
“open[] up exciting new opportunities for small businesses and 
startups . . . to raise capital from investors online”16 by allowing 
businesses to raise up to $1 million from the general public
17
 through 
online fundraising portals.
18
 Unfortunately, the JOBS Act’s effectiveness 
was predicated on the SEC promulgating rules within 270 days.
19
 The 
SEC proposed rules in early 2014
20
 and on October 30, 2015 finally 
                                                     
10. See generally Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing 
Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1 (2007) (arguing 
that, despite the SEC’s acknowledgement of hurdles small businesses face in raising capital, “with 
rare exception, the SEC has turned a deaf ear” to small businesses’ needs). 
11. See Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: 
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 908–09 (2011) (discussing 
securities disclosure requirements and enforcement mechanisms and concluding that “a small 
business issuer will typically find that the costs of a registered public offering . . . outweigh the 
benefits”). 
12. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21 (2015). 
13. Jaime Brockway, The State That Paved the Way for Equity-Based Crowdfunding, BEACON 
READER (Sept. 11, 2014, 8:08 PM), https://www.beaconreader.com/jaime-brockway/the-state-that-
paved-the-way-for-equity-based-crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/G6BN-DN4L]. 
14. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
15. Leigh Ann Caldwell, Obama Signs “JOBS Act” into Law, Calls It a “Game-Changer,” CBS 
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2012, 3:55 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-signs-jobs-act-into-law-
calls-it-a-game-changer/ [https://perma.cc/TZ6A-HXGK]. 
16. Press Release, Jeff Merkley, Merkley: Crowdfunding Exciting New Opportunity for Small 
Businesses and Startups (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/press-releases/ 
merkley-crowdfunding-exciting-new-opportunity-for-small-businesses-and-startups 
[https://perma.cc/5UDV-DBMB]. 
17. JOBS Act § 302(a)(6), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)). 
18. Id. § 302(a)(6)(C), 126 Stat. at 315 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C)). 
19. Id. § 302(c), 126 Stat. at 320. 
20. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Proposal on Crowdfunding (Oct. 23, 2013) 
[hereinafter SEC Crowdfunding Proposal], http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/ 
PressRelease/1370540017677#.VNZyV_54rN8 [https://perma.cc/F3VX-JLMP]. 
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adopted rules to permit crowdfunding nationally.
21
 With federal action 
pending for over three years, states began to take the initiative. The lone 
Kansas exemption ballooned to over twenty-five proposed and enacted 
statutes.
22
 
Although the availability of alternative forms of investing and capital-
raising is a positive development, these alternatives pose risks if 
improperly regulated. In a 2013 report on the potential benefits of 
crowdfunding around the world, the World Bank emphasized that, while 
“[s]uccessful fraud with crowdfunding has been relatively rare,”23 it is 
nonetheless “a legitimate concern.” Indeed, concerns for investor 
protection were a hot topic during the federal legislation process
24—a 
topic eventually decided in favor of additional investor protection in 
tandem with including stricter requirements on small businesses.
25
 By 
contrast, many state statutes and regulations have been deliberately 
drafted in ways that seek to create less stringent restrictions than the 
federal model.
26
 
Legal action at the state and federal levels has legitimized concerns 
about fraud. First, in 2014, the Washington State Attorney General 
brought a lawsuit against Altius Management and its president, Ed 
Nash.
27
 The Attorney General’s complaint alleged that, despite raising 
                                                     
21. Press Release, Securities & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules to Permit Crowdfunding (Oct. 
30, 2015) [hereinafter SEC Crowdfunding Adoption], http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
249.html [https://perma.cc/5U73-LKL2]. 
22. See Anthony J. Zeoli, State of the States—Comparative Summaries of Current Active and 
Proposed Intrastate Crowdfunding Exemptions (Updated), CROWDFUNDINGLEGALHUB.COM 
http://crowdfundinglegalhub.com/2015/01/16/state-of-the-states-compariative-summaries-of-
current-active-and-proposed-intrastate-crowdfunding-exemptions/ [https://perma.cc/8S8Q-DDXG] 
(last updated Dec. 2015). 
23. Crowdfunding’s Potential for the Developing World, WORLD BANK (2013), 
http://www.infodev.org/infodev-files/wb_crowdfundingreport-v12.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PD9-
QV3S]. 
24. See Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 281, 295–97 (2014) (characterizing the legislation process as having “set up a battle between 
two competing camps: the capital formation camp, led by Republican Congressman McHenry, and 
the investor protection camp, helmed by Democratic Senator Jeff Merkley”). 
25. See id. at 297–300. Parsont rehashes the compromise as, on one side, loosening the 
restrictions of Rule 506 to allow issuers to use the internet to access accredited investors and, on the 
other, increasing mandatory disclosures required by the eventual crowdfunding legislation. Id. at 
296–99. 
26. See Steven Davidoff Soloman, S.E.C.’s Delay on Crowdfunding May Just Save It, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK, (Nov. 28, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/s-e-c-s-
delay-on-crowdfunding-may-just-save-it-2/ [https://perma.cc/DV5V-2SLL] (“For good or bad, the 
states don’t seem to care as much about the fraud issue. Consider Texas, which last month proposed 
its own crowdfunding rules that are deliberately more liberal than those proposed by the S.E.C.”). 
27. Press Release, Washington State Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Files 
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over $25,000 from 810 people on Kickstarter, Altius failed to make good 
on its promise to provide investors with the advertised playing card 
game.
28
 That lawsuit resulted in a default judgment.
29
 More recently, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sued Erik Chevalier and his business, 
The Forking Path, for not delivering a promised board game.
30
 After 
Chevalier raised over $122,000 from over 1200 backers, he announced 
that he would not produce the intended board game and would instead 
issue a refund to his investors.
31
 He failed to provide those refunds.
32
 
The FTC settled with Chevalier, prohibiting him from making future 
misrepresentations about crowdfunding and imposing a monetary 
judgment.
33
 
No doubt, the few instances of fraud that result from traditional 
crowdfunding represent a small fraction of the total legitimate offerings. 
Projects on Kickstarter alone have raised over $2 billion, spread across 
more than 100,000 projects.
34
 Nonetheless, the prospect of fraud is real. 
Perhaps even more important, however, is the concern that even 
legitimate projects will result in substantial investor losses. Although it 
is too early to judge whether or how many crowdfunded businesses will 
succeed, there is reason for concern.
35
 Angel investing provides a useful 
comparison. Research shows that angel investors rely on a small number 
                                                     
Lawsuit Against Company Behind Asylum Playing Cards Crowdfunded Project (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/attorney-general-files-lawsuit-against-company-behind-
asylum-playing-cards [https://perma.cc/8JV2-28ML]. 
28. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 2, State v. Altius Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-2-12425-
SEA (King Cty. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 30, 2014), http://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
uploadedfiles/AsylumComplaint%202014-05-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RB5-NVCS]. 
29. Default Judgment, Altius Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-2-12425-SEA (King Cty. Super. Ct. filed July 
22, 2015), http://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/Another/News/Press_ 
Releases/201507221452.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PLY-CS5X]. 
30. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Crowdfunding Project Creator Settles FTC Charges of 
Deception (June 11, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/06/crowdfunding-
project-creator-settles-ftc-charges-deception [https://perma.cc/4MLT-DGMY]. 
31. Complaint at 3, FTC v. Chevalier, No. 15-cv-01029-AC (D. Or. filed June 10, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150611chevaliercmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
XQ2P-DLBN]. 
32. Id. 
33. See Proposed Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 3–5, FTC 
v. Chevalier, No. 15-cv-01029-AC (D. Or. filed June 10, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/cases/150611chevalierstip.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5SZ-4C9Z]. 
34. Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats [https://perma.cc/54AW-BVSN] 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
35. See generally Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493 
(2014) (“The problem with equity crowdfunding is not the extent of disclosure. The problem is that 
the companies that participate will be terrible prospects.”). 
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of highly profitable investments to pull most of their portfolio’s weight: 
the top ten percent of investments resulted in seventy-five percent of all 
returns, while fifty-two percent lost money.
36
 Because the typical 
crowdfunding investor lacks the angel investor’s expertise, ability to 
diversify, and active participation in an investment strategy, she is much 
less likely to find the hidden gems that make angel investing 
worthwhile.
37
 
What these anecdotes and figures suggest is not that crowdfunding 
should be abandoned, but that it warrants caution. This Comment 
explores the range of approaches states have taken to regulate 
crowdfunding by identifying those provisions that appear insufficiently 
protective of investors and proposing improvements to better protect 
investors without overburdening small businesses. Part I provides basic 
background information, starting with the original state blue sky laws 
and continuing onto the federal Securities Act of 1933. By looking to the 
prevailing rationale when those laws were passed, Part I suggests that 
relaxed regulatory requirements in some new crowdfunding laws fail to 
live up to historic standards. Part II discusses in some depth several 
approaches different jurisdictions have taken when attempting to 
regulate crowdfunding. That Part begins by laying out the provisions 
contained in the JOBS Act itself and then continues on to explain 
relevant portions of several state crowdfunding laws. Finally, Part III 
focuses on two areas. First, it compares the various provisions contained 
in state statutes with an emphasis on how both individual provisions and 
the statutes as a whole seek to achieve investor protection. Second, it 
uses these statutes as a baseline to argue that certain provisions should 
be included within state-level crowdfunding statutes to adequately guard 
against investor injury. 
I. SECURITIES LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 
In order to appreciate the importance of the changes taking place in 
the crowdfunding space, it is important to start with a history of 
securities regulation more generally. This Part begins by discussing state 
securities laws and then moves to a summary of those laws’ federal 
counterpart. Understanding how the securities laws came about 
historically and function currently is important for two reasons. The first 
is technical: because securities laws govern interstate commercial 
transactions, state laws exist only to the extent allowed by the federal 
                                                     
36. Id. at 511. 
37. Id. at 513–15. 
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government.
38
 Briefly discussing this unique interplay is important to 
understanding how state crowdfunding laws do and should function. 
The second reason for describing securities laws in their historical 
context is more normative. Kansas passed the first blue sky law as a 
reaction to concerns about overly speculative investments;
39
 the federal 
government followed suit a short time later. Other Depression-era 
financial protections—particularly the Banking Act of 1933 (known as 
Glass-Steagall)
40—have been chipped away or repealed altogether, with 
damaging results.
41
 The parallels between banking deregulation and 
security deregulation are certainly not perfect, and the primary 
protections provided by the Securities Act and Exchange Act are 
undoubtedly still in place. Even so, the general principle remains valid: 
important protections enacted by the people closest to a perceived harm 
should not be drawn back carelessly. This Part begins with a discussion 
of where those protections came from. 
A.  The Beginnings of Securities Laws in the Kansas Blue Sky 
Early American securities regulation was a creature of the states.
42
 
Such regulation often focused on specific industries: the first, passed in 
1852 in Massachusetts, required railroad companies to certify that 
“reasonable parties” subscribed to their stock and paid a threshold of par 
value.
43
 Before that, English securities laws placed limits on 
stockbrokers and the filing of a prospectus with government officials 
before any company could issue securities to the public.
44
 Even though 
modern state statutes regulate a wider range of offerings than the early 
statutes, most continue to focus on the offer and sale of securities rather 
than attempt to impose subsequent registration requirements.
45
 Despite 
                                                     
38. See infra Section I.C.1. 
39. See infra Section I.A. 
40. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
41. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963 (2009) 
(discussing how the repeal of Glass-Steagall in the 1990s gave rise to consolidation of the banking 
and securities industries and resulted in the late-2000’s financial crisis). 
42. See generally Rick A. Fleming, 100 Years of Securities Law: Examining a Foundation Laid 
in the Kansas Blue Sky, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 586 (2011) (reviewing the development of state 
securities laws). 
43. Id. at 586. 
44. Id. 
45. JOSEPH C. LONG, 12 BLUE SKY LAW § 1:5 (2012). 
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changes over time to the form of regulation in state securities law,
46
 
much of the focus is still the same now as then: protecting investors 
from fraudulent offerings.
47
 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, America was in a period of 
intense modernization. The era incubated a number of history-changing 
inventions. New methods of communication, namely Thomas Edison’s 
invention of the phonograph and motion picture, allowed Americans to 
access a world previously unheard and unseen.
48
 New means of 
transportation, from the Wright Brothers’ flight to Henry Ford’s Model 
T, allowed Americans to experience that world in new and exciting 
ways.
49
 For early twentieth century Americans, the sky was quite 
literally the limit. 
Exceptional technological change brought with it additional promises. 
America’s lower classes at the time had suffered through difficult 
working conditions, limited economic opportunity, and the prospect of 
premature death.
50
 As these struggles slowly churned, organized labor 
began to increase in popularity and the middle class started making itself 
heard.
51
 The country had begun to recover from the depression of the 
1890s with new, hopefully more stable corporate behemoths.
52
 
Widespread growth and the success of heavy industries like rail and 
manufacturing required access to ever-increasing sources of capital.
53
 
The masses did not want to be left out. An onlooker observed that that 
“[t]here seems to be something fascinating to the average citizen about a 
proposition to buy stock in a company that is undertaking to build a 
railroad, or dig a mine, or plant fields of rice and tobacco . . . .”54 
Partially to tap into this growing demand for returns and partially to 
                                                     
46. See id. § 1:7. 
47. See, e.g., A.S. Goldmen & Co. v. New Jersey Bureau of Sec., 163 F.3d 780, 781 (3d Cir. 
1999) (“The purpose of these so-called ‘blue sky’ laws was to allow state authorities to prevent 
unknowing buyers from being defrauded into buying securities that appeared valuable but in fact 
were worthless.”). 
48. MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 234 (2006). 
49. See id. at 226–28. 
50. See id. at 14. 
51. Id. at 32, 39. 
52. Daniel T. Rodgers, The Progressive Era to the New Era, 1900-1929, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. 
AM. HIST., http://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/essays/progressive-era-new-era-1900-1929 
[https://perma.cc/47LE-RBLV] (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). 
53. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 
352–353 (1991). 
54. Saving the People’s Money, 6 TICKER & INV. DIG. 156, 157 (1910). 
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make real returns in the face of increasing inflation, business owners 
began to offer interests in increasingly speculative ventures.
55
 Politicians 
worried that the public’s fascination with investment would lead to 
overly speculative investment and disproportionate losses.
56
 
Accordingly, states wasted little time in crafting local protections. In 
1911, Kansas passed the first modern securities statute.
57
 That law 
allowed the state’s bank commissioner to block an offering that failed to 
provide a “fair, just and equitable plan for the transaction of business.”58 
Many followed Kansas’s lead: by 1931, all states but Nevada had 
enacted similar laws.
59
 
Although updated several times over the next few years, Kansas’s 
original blue sky law was relatively straightforward.
60
 At four pages 
long, the law succinctly governed activities of “investment companies” 
that offered any of a variety of financial instruments to Kansas 
residents.
61
 An issuer had to submit documents regarding its proposed 
offering and future activities for review by the state bank commissioner, 
who could accept or reject based on whether he “deem[ed] it 
advisable.”62 This type of review would be dubbed “merit regulation.”63 
                                                     
55. See Macey & Miller, supra note 53, at 354–56 (“Speculative securities were typically ‘hyped’ 
by sales puffery that bordered on misrepresentation—and undoubtedly sometimes crossed the 
line.”). One writer contemporaneously warned the investing public of overhyped schemes and “the 
delusion of ‘easy money.’” Euphemia Holden, The Delusion of Sudden Riches, 83 BANKERS MAG. 
186, 187 (1911). 
56. See The Kansas Blue Sky Law, 75 CENT. L.J. 221, 222 (1912) (quoting Kansas bank 
commissioner J.N. Dolley, drafter of the first blue sky law as saying that “where there has been one 
dollar invested in mining, oil and gas stocks there has been 98 cents lost.”). 
57. Act of March 10, 1911, ch. 133, 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210. 
58. C.A. Dykstra, Notes on Current Legislation, 7 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 230, 231 (1913). At the 
time, Kansas’s bank commissioner, J.N. Dolley, was also its most ardent blue sky law advocate. See 
Fleming, supra note 42, at 595–97 (2011). Although this dual role suggests that Dolley’s support for 
securities regulation could have been based on ulterior motives, Fleming argues that, while possible, 
such an “explanation is far too simplistic because it fails to explain the wide popular appeal of the 
blue sky law and other banking reforms.” Id. at 597. 
59. Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 46 
J.L. & ECON. 229, 232 (2003). 
60. The term “blue sky law” allegedly comes from a scheme by Chicago salespeople who 
marketed a rain-making machine to drought-stricken Kansas farmers. Fleming, supra note 42, at 
585. When the machine inevitably failed, the salesmen left with cash and without fulfilling their 
promise. From that rouse came the term: “it refers to an investment opportunity in which the 
promoter promises rain but delivers blue sky.” Id. at 586. 
61. Id. at 601. 
62. Id. at 602. 
63. Merit regulation is defined as: 
[A] regulatory system that authorizes state administrators to deny registration to a securities 
offering unless the substantive terms of the offering and the associated transactions (i) ensure a 
fair relation between promoters and public investors, and (ii) provide public investors with a 
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B. The Theories Behind Modern Securities Regulation 
Merit regulation is one of two dominant philosophies of securities 
regulation. Although less popular than in the years immediately 
following the adoption of the first blue sky law, major states like 
California
64
 and Texas
65
 continue to utilize merit-based review. By 
contrast, a significantly more permissive approach requires no state-level 
registration and uses antifraud protections alone. Only New York’s 
Martin Act
66
 applies this model. In between, some states have matched 
the federal approach, which mandates pre-offering disclosure.
67
 A fourth 
model, and the most popular, combines disclosure requirements with 
merit review. 
For most jurisdictions, one of these philosophies has been inserted 
within the provisions of the Uniform Securities Act.
68
 Currently used in 
some fashion in forty-three states and territories,
69
 the Uniform Act was 
                                                     
reasonable relation of risk to return. While merit and disclosure regulation should not be 
regarded as antitheses, merit regulation differs from disclosure regulation in its direct 
regulation of the internal structure of a securities issuer, of the relations among insiders and 
outsiders, and of the terms of the offering. 
Mark A. Sargent, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785, 829 
(1986). The underlying substantive goal of merit regulation—to promote an offering’s fairness—is 
reached by, first, preventing promoters from acquiring a company’s stock at depressed prices prior 
to its offering and, second, protecting the public against exploitation from underwriters who seek 
excessive fees. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky 
Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553, 563–67 (1985). For an additional discussion of merit regulation, see 
Ronald J. Colombo, Merit Regulation via the Suitability Rules, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 1 (2013). 
64. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (“The commissioner 
may issue a stop order denying . . . any qualification of an underwritten offering of securities . . . if 
he or she finds (A) that the order is in the public interest and (B) that the proposed plan of business 
of the issuer or the proposed issuance or sale of securities is not fair, just, or equitable . . . .”). 
65. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-7(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“No 
dealer or agent shall sell or offer for sale any securities . . . until the issuer of such securities or a 
dealer registered under the provisions of this Act shall have been granted a permit by the 
Commissioner.”). 
66. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 343 (McKinney 2016) (“Whenever it shall appear to the attorney-
general, either upon complaint or otherwise, that in [the sale of a security], any person . . . shall have 
employed . . . any [fraudulent scheme], he may in his discretion either require or permit such 
person . . . to file with him a statement in writing under oath or otherwise as to all the facts and 
circumstances concerning the subject matter which he believes it is to the public interest to 
investigate . . . .”). 
67. See infra Section I.B. 
68. LONG, supra note 45, § 1:7. 
69. These jurisdictions include the District of Columbia, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. A 
breakdown shows that twenty jurisdictions base their laws on the 1956 Uniform Act, four on the 
1985 Act, nineteen on the 2002 act, and ten are not modeled after any version. Pamela M. Heinrich, 
U.S. Survey: State Adoption of Uniform Securities Act, NAT’L ASS’N FOR FIXED ANNUITIES, 
http://www.nafa.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/20120920-NAFA-Uniform-Security-Act-
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promulgated in 1956,
70
 revised first in 1985,
71
 and then revised a second 
time in 2002.
72
 The Uniform Act, as well as all independent blue sky 
laws other than New York’s, employs three primary regulatory elements: 
securities registration, intermediary regulation, and antifraud 
enforcement.
73
 State securities laws, the Uniform Act included, are 
concerned predominantly with offers and sales of securities as well as 
the supervision of securities professionals, rather than with ongoing 
reporting requirements and secondary market transactions.
74
 The drafters 
of the Uniform Act—the first model legislation of its kind in the 
securities field
75—formatted their model in a way that allows adopting 
states to choose among standalone provisions for any of the three 
regulatory areas.
76
 
Registration of securities, the first area of concern for most states and 
the topic this Comment focuses on, requires issuers to submit materials 
to a state administrator. The Uniform Act allows for three different 
forms of registration, balancing the need to protect investors against a 
desire to limit redundancy and excess costs for potential issuers.
77
 The 
first, registration by coordination, allows a registration statement filed 
pursuant to a federal offering in compliance with the Securities Act to 
qualify at the state level.
78
 Second, registration by filing is most useful 
for larger companies which already have shares outstanding.
79
 Finally, 
                                                     
Adoption_At-A-Glance.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2NV-ZNEA] (last updated Oct. 12, 2012). 
70. UNIF. SEC. ACT (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 748 (2006). 
71. UNIF. SEC. ACT (amended 1988), 7C U.L.A. 221 (2006). 
72. UNIF. SEC. ACT (amended 2002), 7C U.L.A. 20 (2006). 
73. See ROBERT N. RAPP, BLUE SKY REGULATION 1-2 to 1-7 (2003). In this context, 
“registration” refers to process issuers have to go through in order to sell securities to investors; 
registration almost always requires submission of designated information to the relevant 
administrator. Id. at 1-3. 
74. Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory 
Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (1987). 
75. See RAPP, supra note 73, at 1-20. Rapp notes that, although the Uniform Sales of Securities 
Act was released in 1929, it managed to gain minimal traction and the passage of the Securities Act 
of 1933 rendered it obsolete. Id. at 1-20 n.10. 
76. The provisions, although now slightly reorganized, were labeled as: Part I for fraudulent 
practices, UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 101–02 (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 749 (2006); Part II for 
intermediary registration and regulation, id. §§ 201–04, 7C U.L.A. 777; and Part III for registration 
of securities, id. §§ 301–06, 7C U.L.A. 793. The final Part IV contains sections for definitions, 
exemptions, and criminal and civil penalties among others. Id. §§ 401–20, 7C U.L.A. 817. 
77. See The Uniform Securities Act, 12 STAN. L. REV. 105, 106 (1959) (“[P]aper work would be 
minimized if the federal prospectus were used by state administrators as their basic source of 
information.”). 
78. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 303 (amended 2002), 7C U.L.A. 81 (2006). 
79. Id. § 302, 7C U.L.A. 74. 
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registration by qualification—the most onerous of the three—is provided 
for issuers unable to qualify under the previous two methods.
80
 Although 
in these sections the Uniform Act continues to empower administrators 
to exercise a form of merit review, the revised version has followed the 
trend ongoing in many states to expand certain exemptions to facilitate 
offerings in limited circumstances.
81
 
C. The Federal Approach to Small-Dollar Securities Regulation: The 
Securities Act of 1933 and Its Exemptions 
The excitement that led to the passage of state securities laws presents 
a stark contrast with the misery that preceded the federal securities laws. 
Rather than the relative prosperity of the early years of the 1900s and the 
perceived need to protect eager investors, federal securities laws were 
drafted as a response to the 1929 stock market crash and subsequent 
Great Depression.
82
 Although the federal securities laws were originally 
modeled after the merit-based review used in many states, President 
Roosevelt rejected merit review as overly paternalistic.
83
 
Instead, the Securities Act of 1933
84
 attempts to protect investors by 
mandating information disclosure and prohibiting fraudulent practices.
85
 
Disclosure is achieved through section 5, which requires that prospective 
issuers file a registration statement for the SEC to review,
86
 file a public 
statement,
87
 and to wait a mandatory period before securities can be 
                                                     
80. Id. § 304, 7C U.L.A. 84. 
81. See RAPP, supra note 73, at 1-21 n.17 (noting exclusion from merit review for “seasoned” 
issuers in section 302(a) and an expanded limited offering exemption in section 402(11)). These 
exemptions, updated in the most recent revision of the Uniform Act to account for the National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012), are not generally relevant 
here. For a list of the included exemptions, see RAPP, supra note 73, at 7-10 to 7-13. 
82. Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and the Case for 
Federal Merit Review, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 678 (2010). 
83. Id. at 679. The President made a statement regarding the first version of the Securities Act of 
1933, explaining that: 
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which might be 
construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the sense that 
their value will be maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn profit. 
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities to be 
sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and information . . . . 
H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933). 
84. 15 U.S.C. § 77a–77aa. 
85. MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 163 (5th ed. 2009). 
86. 15 U.S.C. § 77f. 
87. Id. § 77e(c). 
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sold.
88
 Through these disclosures, legislators hoped to provide investors 
with enough information to ensure an informed investment decision.
89
 
Although the SEC does not verify the truth of the registered 
information,
90
 section 11 provides the Act with significant teeth to 
combat fraud.
91
 
The Securities Act’s disclosure requirements and antifraud provisions 
were a response to a clear problem with state securities regulation. 
Because blue sky antifraud protections could not reach beyond state 
borders,
92
 waves of securities fraud victimized investors in the late 1910s 
and again in the 1920s.
93
 In addition, a single federal securities 
regulatory scheme created efficiencies impossible to achieve with a 
piecemeal system.
94
 Under pure state-based securities laws, when a 
fraudulent issuer sold securities to the residents of several states, any 
subsequent lawsuits were likely to result in inconsistent decisions and 
legal standards.
95
 
Even so, Congress understood the need for continued state regulation. 
Not only did the 1933 Act expressly retain the states’ ability to protect 
local investors,
96
 but it also created an intrastate exemption where state 
regulations alone would operate.
97
 Indeed, Congress has since expressed 
a desire for additional federal-state coordination.
98
 To that end, state 
laws continue to play an important role in ensuring that the entire 
                                                     
88. Id. § 77h(a). 
89. STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 163. 
90. Id. 
91. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
92. See Daniel J. McCauley, Jr., Intrastate Securities Transactions Under the Federal Securities 
Act, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 937, 941 (1959) (“Federal securities legislation was enacted, among other 
reasons, to supplement state regulation by closing the door to interstate transactions as to which 
state regulation was being frustrated.”); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual 
Regulation of Securities: A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495, 515–16 (1984) (noting 
that the success of state securities regimes “led unscrupulous promoters to develop schemes to elude 
the reach of process through the use of interstate facilities.”). 
93. Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. 
L. 1, 18 (1983). 
94. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of 
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 697–98 (1984). 
95. Id. 
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (“[N]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities 
commission . . . of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the 
provisions of this chapter.”); Id. § 78bb(a) (providing the same). 
97. Id. § 77c; see also infra Section I.B.1. 
98. Id. § 77s(d)(1). 
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regulatory system functions.
99
 Because of state support, federal 
securities regulators and federal courts have been able to reduce the 
scope of their investigations and allow state systems to pick up the slack. 
This has included a trend to reduce the number of securities cases heard 
in the federal system.
100
 In contrast, state courts have tended to expand 
their definition of what activities qualify for regulation by blue sky 
laws.
101
 Not only do local agencies help the SEC shoulder a substantial 
regulatory burden, but they also provide regulatory innovations useful to 
the entire system.
102
 Equity crowdfunding, the subject of this Comment, 
provides but one example. 
In part because of the added layer of security provided by state-level 
protections and in part because of its concern with balancing fraud 
protection with capital formation,
103
 the Commission has created several 
exemptions from the typical disclosure requirements. Categorized as 
either “Exempted Securities” in section 3 or “Exempted Transactions” in 
section 4,
104
 issuers using an exemption are not required to follow the 
section 5 disclosure requirements.
105
 The exempted securities listed in 
section 3 are excluded based on “the intrinsic nature of the issuer or the 
character of the security itself.”106 This includes, among others: short-
                                                     
99. Sargent, supra note 74, at 1060–66 (responding in the affirmative to “whether state disclosure 
regulation plays a positive role in the allocation of regulatory responsibilities between the states and 
the SEC”). 
100. LONG, supra note 45, § 1:7. This trend has been similarly facilitated by congressional action, 
with the passage of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 providing one example. See 
Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of 
Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273 (1998) (“A consequence of the Act . . . was to shift a significant 
portion of securities fraud class action litigation from federal to state court.”). 
101. LONG, supra note 45, § 1:7; see, e.g., Stanley v. Commercial Courier Serv., Inc., 411 F. 
Supp. 818, 823 (D. Or. 1975) (finding that a franchising scheme was not a security under federal 
law, but was under Oregon state law). 
102. Sargent, supra note 74, at 1066. 
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (“[T]he Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection 
of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”). 
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (Section 3); 15 U.S.C. § 77d (Section 4). In addition to the specific 
provisions in that section, section 3(b) states that “[t]he Commission may from time to time by its 
rules and regulations . . . add any class of securities to the securities exempted as provided in this 
section, if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not 
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount 
involved or the limited character of the public offering; but no issue of securities shall . . . exceed[] 
$5,000,000.” Id. § 77(c)(b)(1). 
105. See id. § 77e (exempting the securities listed in “the provisions of section 77c or 77d of this 
title.”). None of these exemptions, however, protect the issuer against fraud liability prescribed by 
the Securities Act. Id. § 77q. 
106. J. WILLIAM HICKS, 7 EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, at 1-
17 (2003). Not all of the securities listed in section 3 are treated as exempted securities: only 
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term commercial promissory notes;
107
 securities issued by nonprofit, 
religious, educational, or charitable organizations;
108
 and securities of 
building and loan or farmer cooperatives.
109
 Because the exemption is 
seen to apply to the security itself rather than the issuing transaction, an 
issuer must comply only with the terms of the specific exemption.
110
 In 
contrast, the transactional exemption afforded to the rest of section 3 and 
the entirety of section 4 applies more narrowly. Because that exemption 
applies to a specific transaction alone, subsequent resale transactions 
must not only comply with registration requirements, but the issuer must 
follow the exemption’s conditions for the duration of the offering.111 
Of these two categories, transactional exemptions are more 
commonly used in the small business context.
112
 The following 
exemptions are particularly relevant to facilitating small business capital 
formation.
113
 The first, the “intrastate exemption,” was a product of the 
original Securities Act and expressly maintains state authority to govern 
securities within state boarders. The second and third are regulatory 
exemptions issued by the SEC based on the discretion extended to it by 
section 3(b) of the Securities Act, which allows the Commission 
considerable leeway in dealing with small offerings.
114
 
                                                     
sections 3(a)(2) through 3(a)(8) receive that special distinction. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2)–(a)(8). The 
remaining portions of section 3 are classified as exempt transactions like those in section 4. HICKS, 
supra, at 1-17. 
107. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3). 
108. Id. § 77c(a)(4). 
109. Id. § 77c(a)(5). 
110. HICKS, supra note 106, at 1-17. 
111. Id. at 1-17 to 1-18. In an intrastate offering, for example, all securities sold must “come to 
rest” in the hands of state residents. Because this requirement means the actual transaction could last 
for up to a year after the issuer sells its final security, the issuer does not comply with the 
exemption’s technical requirements until after passing through that resting period. Id. at 1-18. 
112. See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses’ Search for “A Moderate 
Capital,” 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 92–99 (2006) (discussing the various exemptions available to 
small businesses: intrastate offerings, private placements, and Regulation D). 
113. Other safe harbors not discussed here include Regulation A, see id. at 111-21 (discussing use 
of and prescribing changes for Regulation A), as well as a variety of niche safe harbors not broadly 
applicable. See HICKS, supra note 106, at 1-16.1 to 1-17 (listing exempted securities); id. at 1-25 to 
1-33 (discussing and categorizing exempted transaction).  
114. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (“The Commission may . . . add any class of securities to the securities 
exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect 
to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason 
of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering; but no issue of 
securities shall . . . [exceed] $5,000,000.”). 
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1. The Intrastate Exemption and Rule 147 Safe Harbor 
The intrastate exemption, section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act,
115
 
carves from the federal disclosure requirements an exemption that 
requires issuers to comply only with state law. The exemption allows 
smaller issuers to sell securities through a local financing plan, under a 
theory that investors would be protected by their proximity to the issuer 
and that state’s blue sky law.116 The requirements to qualify for this 
exemption include: (1) the issuer must be a resident of or incorporated in 
the state; (2) the issuer must conduct a substantial amount of its business 
within the state; (3) the proceeds of the offering must be used within the 
state; (4) the offerees and purchasers must be residents of that state; (5) 
securities offered through the transaction must come to rest in persons 
residing in the state; and (6) the entire securities issuance must be made 
pursuant to the section 3(a)(11) exemption.
117
 Failure to comply with 
each of these requirements defeats the exemption and could result in 
civil liability and other sanctions for the issuer.
118
 
Although seemingly straightforward, uncertainty regarding how the 
SEC would define and police the section’s terms prompted further 
explanation. The result was Rule 147,
119
 adopted in January 1974, which 
clarifies but does not replace the statutory standard.
120
 With regards to 
residence of the issuer, Rule 147 repeatedly applies an eighty percent 
standard: eighty percent of the business’s gross revenues during the last 
fiscal year must come from the state;
121
 eighty percent of its assets, along 
with its principal office, must be located in the state;
122
 and eighty 
                                                     
115. Id. § 77c(a)(11). 
116. Notice of Adoption of Rule 147 Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release 
No. 5450, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 2340 (Jan. 7, 1974) [hereinafter Rule 147 Release]. 
117. HICKS, supra note 106, at 4-4. See generally Section 3(a)(11) Exemption for Local 
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶2270 (Dec. 6, 1961) 
(discussing the requirements to qualify for the intrastate exemption). 
118. These sanctions can include an injunction prohibiting further distributions of securities 
without registering, requiring an offer of redemption for all prior securities transactions, and 
recommendation of criminal prosecution. HICKS, supra note 106, at 4-6 n.10. 
119. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2016). 
120. If any issuer fails to qualify under Rule 147, it is technically possible to qualify under the 
less-well-defined intrastate exemption. See Rule 147 Release, supra note 116 (“The rule is a 
nonexclusive rule. However, persons who choose to rely on section 3(a)(11) without complying 
with all the conditions of the rule would have the burden of establishing that they have complied 
with the judicial and administrative interpretations of section 3(a)(11) in effect at the time of the 
offering.”). 
121. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(4)(c)(2)(i). 
122. Id. § 230.147(4)(c)(2)(ii). 
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percent of the offering’s net proceeds must be used in the state.123 The 
Rule maintains the requirement that all offerees and purchasers must be 
state residents, interpreted to mean that the individual’s “principal 
residence” is within state boundaries.124 Finally, the rule prohibits 
purchasers from reselling to anyone not a resident of the state and from 
reselling securities for the nine months after the final sale of that issue.
125
 
2. Regulation D and Rule 504 
Regulation D was the SEC’s response to economic hardship among 
the American small business community during the 1970s.
126
 During 
three weeks in the spring of 1978, the Commission held public hearings 
in order to better “determin[e] the extent to which the burdens imposed 
on small businesses by the federal securities law could be alleviated 
consistent with the protection of investors.”127 The result was three new 
safe harbors and six total rules that updated the then-existing safe 
harbors for small issuers.
128
 
Regulation D is structured by listing generally applicable 
requirements first, followed by three substantive safe harbors. Rule 501 
contains definitions, including one for “accredited investor,” which 
includes individuals with over $1 million in net worth outside of their 
primary residence,
129
 over $200,000 in income alone, or $300,000 in 
income together with a spouse.
130
 Rule 502 restricts the allowed “manner 
of offering” by prohibiting general solicitation and advertising as well as 
resale of the purchased securities.
131
 Finally, Rule 503 requires the issuer 
                                                     
123. Id. § 230.147(4)(c)(2)(iii). 
124. Id. § 230.147(4)(d)(2). 
125. Id. § 230.147(4)(e). 
126. J. WILLIAM HICKS, 7a EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, at 
7-14 (2003). 
127. Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited 
Offers & Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, [1981–1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982). 
128. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.506; see Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the 
Registration Provisions of the Sec. Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Ltd. Offers & Sales, 
Securities Act Release No. 6339, [1981–1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,014, 
at 84,457 (Aug. 7, 1981) [hereinafter Exemption Revision Release]. Subsequently, the enforcement 
mechanisms were added in Rules 507 and 508 to complete the series of rules which today make up 
Regulation D. The goal of the new rules was to “simplify and clarify existing exemptions, to expand 
their availability, and to achieve uniformity between Federal and state exemptions.” Id. The 
rescinded exemptions were codified as Rules 146, 240, and 242. Id. 
129. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5). 
130. Id. § 230.501(a)(6). 
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to file a notice of offering with the SEC.
132
 
Of the substantive safe harbors, the most relevant to state 
crowdfunding is Rule 504.
133
 Derived from the SEC’s power in section 
3(b), Rule 504 was intended to create a “clear and workable exemption 
for small offerings by small issuers to be regulated by state ‘Blue Sky’ 
requirements.”134 To that end, the SEC has attempted to coordinate 
federal and state requirements. Although Rule 504 incorporates the 
solicitation and resale restrictions noted above, an issuer receives an 
exemption from those requirements if it either registers its offering 
pursuant to an applicable blue sky law or offers its securities to 
accredited investors alone.
135
 The safe harbor, which originally capped 
its offerings to $500,000,
136
 now allows for offerings of up to $1 million 
within a twelve-month period.
137
 
D. Securities Regulation and Federalism: State Action in a 
Federally-Dominated Field 
In an area dominated by federal statutes and regulations, states play a 
diminished but still-important role in encouraging capital formation and 
protecting investors.
138
 This role has long been expressly recognized in 
federal law,
139
 with the federal government intending to leverage local 
experience with securities regulation when it developed its own 
regulatory system in the 1930s.
140
 As noted above, the federal version 
has emphasized disclosure as a means of investor protection, while many 
                                                     
131. Id. § 230.502(c) (prohibiting general solicitation, including “[a]ny advertisement, article, 
notice or other communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast 
over television or radio”); id.§ 230.502(d). 
132. Id. § 230.503(a). 
133. The two other substantive safe harbors under Regulation D are Rules 505 and 506. Briefly 
stated, Rule 505 allows an issuer to raise up to $5 million within a twelve-month period from an 
unlimited number of accredited investors and up to thirty-five non-accredited investors. Rule 506 
allows an issuer to raise an unlimited amount of money from an unlimited number of accredited and 
up to thirty-five non-accredited investors. See HICKS, supra note 126, at 7-22 to 7-24. 
134. Exemption Revision Release, supra note 128. 
135. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b). 
136. Exemption Revision Release, supra note 128. 
137. 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(b)(2). 
138. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
139. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (preserving, among other things, the right of state securities 
commissions to “retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate and bring 
enforcement actions”); supra notes 111–25 and accompanying text (discussing the federal intrastate 
exemption and the Rule 147 safe harbor). 
140. Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities 
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 112 (2005). 
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states employ merit review.
141
 Despite the added protection against 
securities fraud and other abuses, the dual system was criticized as 
inefficient and unnecessarily burdensome on issuers who needed to 
comply with both federal and state requirements.
142
 
Over time, lawmakers began to address state-federal coordination 
issues by implementing a more uniform system at the state level.
143
 This 
process included the promulgation of the Uniform Securities Act in 
1956,
144
 the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption in 1983,
145
 and the 
creation of a Small Corporate Offering Registration (SCOR) form in 
1989.
146
 Even with these changes, the securities industry voiced 
dissatisfaction with the slow pace of reform and the system’s persistent 
redundancies.
147
 The result of this continued discontent was, among 
other things, the National Securities Markets Improvement Act 
(NSMIA), passed in 1996.
148
 NSMIA reduced the regulatory burden 
                                                     
141. Compare supra Section I.B (discussing merit review used in some states), with supra 
Section I.C (discussing disclosure required by the federal Securities Act); see also Jeffrey D. 
Chadwick, Comment, Proving Preemption by Proving Exemption: The Quandary of the National 
Securities Market Improvement Act, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 765, 768 (2009) (“Though theoretically 
opposed, the two philosophies were designed to work together to avoid the pitfalls that precipitated 
the 1929 crash.”). 
142. See Jones, supra note 140, at 112; Chadwick, supra note 141, at 769. 
143. For a discussion of the changes in state and federal law aimed at increasing uniformity, see 
Kenneth I. Denos, Blue and Gray Skies: The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 
Makes the Case for Uniformity in State Securities Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 101, and Rutheford B 
Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175 
(1997). 
144. UNIF. SEC. ACT (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 748 (2006).  
145. Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶6201, 
http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/UNIFORM-LIMITED-OFFERING-
EXEMPTION.pdf [https://perma.cc/U53Y-BSK4]. This uniform law was intended to provide a 
template for state to copy, in order to facilitate coordination of state and federal securities 
exemptions and thereby benefit small businesses. Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: 
Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 248–49 
(1990). 
146. See SCOR Overview, NORTH AM. SEC. ADMINS. ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.org/industry-
resources/corporation-finance/scor-overview/ [https://perma.cc/D4DY-L5AH] (last visited Jan. 16, 
2016) (“The Form was designed for use by companies seeking to raise capital through a public 
offering of securities exempt from registration with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) under [Rule 504 and section 3(a)(11), among others].”). 
147. Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the 
United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 508 (2003). 
148. National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). State law was also preempted in the 1990s 
by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), which precluded state courts from hearing 
class actions in connection with a security sold on a national exchange. For a more thorough 
discussion of the SLUSA, see Selby P. Brown, Don’t Throw the Baby out with the Bath Water: The 
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placed on issuers by precluding states from requiring securities 
registration, conducting merit review, and requiring delivery of pre-
offering prospectuses for “covered securities.”149 These securities 
include, among others, those of companies listed on national exchanges 
or NASDAQ, securities sold pursuant to transactions exempt from 
registration—for example, under the section 4(a)(2) exemption and 
related Regulation D safe harbor, or under the section 4(a)(6) 
crowdfunding exemption—and sales made to “qualified purchasers,” as 
defined by the SEC rule.
150
 
Even with the enactment of NSMIA and other preemptive federal 
laws, state securities laws remain an important element of securities 
regulation. As a legal matter, courts have made clear that Congress did 
not intend to occupy the field of securities regulation generally,
151
 and 
Congress has explicitly stated when it intends to preempt states.
152
 As a 
practical matter, states have been important players in combating 
fraud.
153
 In the early 2000s, for example, New York used the threat of 
liability under its Martin Act to compel Merrill Lynch to separate its 
securities research and investment banking divisions.
154
 Regulation of 
Wall Street is the most prominent, but not the only, example of the 
importance of state protections. Despite federal securities regulation’s 
increased presence, state enforcement of securities laws is essential 
when, for example, an issuer decides to use the safe harbor under Rule 
147.
155
 
                                                     
Merits of the Intermediate Approach to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, 66 OKLA. 
L. REV. 363 (2014). 
149. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
150. Id. § 77r(b); see also Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 151, 154 (2010). The SEC later clarified that “qualified purchasers” would be 
limited to “large accredited investors”—legal entities with assets of at least $10 million or 
individuals with at least $2.5 million in investments or $400,000 in individual income. Revisions of 
Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 8828, [2007 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,939, 85,174 (Aug. 3, 2007). 
151. See, e.g., Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1107 (4th Cir. 1989); 
N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 582 (9th Cir. 1983).  
152. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a), with id. § 77p(b). 
153. See Christine A. Bruenn, NASAA President, Testimony Before the United States Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs: Wall Street Analyst Conflicts of Interest 
Global Settlement (May 7, 2003), http://www.nasaa.org/882/wall-street-analyst-conflicts-of-
interest-global-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/4SFP-SQKD] (discussing the states’ roles in the 
investigation of Wall Street practices in the early 2000s). 
154. See Karmel, supra note 147, at 519–22. 
155. See supra notes 94–105 and accompanying text. 
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II. EXISTING CROWDFUNDING LEGISLATION AT THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE LEVEL 
The SEC’s goals—to protect investors, maintain efficient markets, 
and facilitate capital formation
156—are inherently at odds. Mandated 
disclosure and merit review attempt to provide investors with 
information and weed out bad actors, but at a significant cost to issuers. 
Nowhere is that tension more acutely felt than in the small business 
community, where businesses lack sufficient economies of scale to make 
up for the cost of a registered offering.
157
 Both state and federal 
securities laws create an environment in which transactional and 
structural burdens on small-dollar offerings are frequently cost-
prohibitive.
158
 
This problem bears out in actions taken by regulators. On the one 
hand, it is easy to extol the benefits of strong small business 
performance. In a recent annual SEC Forum on Small Business Capital 
Formation, Commissioner Luis Aguilar commented that “the success of 
small businesses is essential to the sustained growth of our greater 
economy.”159 He added that between 1993 and 2013, “[s]mall firms were 
responsible for 63 percent of the net new jobs created” in America.160 On 
the other hand, the SEC has been a reluctant partner in efforts to 
facilitate small-dollar capital formation. Repeated comments about the 
importance of this subset of the American economy have been followed 
up with “[p]recious little attention . . . to the more numerous and difficult 
concerns faced by small companies seeking to raise capital through 
exemption from registration.”161 The frustration among the small 
business community and its supporters culminated in a groundswell of 
support for the JOBS Act.
162
 
                                                     
156. What We Do, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#.VNEgd_54rN8 [https://perma.cc/4K6G-ZQMC] (last 
modified June 10, 2013). 
157. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The New Regulation of Small Business Capital Formation: The 
Impact-If Any-of the Jobs Act, 102 KY. L.J. 815, 817–18 (2014) (describing how the limited size of 
many small business’s capital needs results in substantial fixed transaction costs and how securities 
regulation impedes small-dollar offerings). 
158. Campbell, supra note 157, at 817–18. 
159. Record of Proceedings, 33rd Annual Securities and Exchange Commission Government-
Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation 16 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/sbforum112014-final-transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/UN9M-
KVB8]. 
160. Id.  
161. Cohn & Yadley, supra note 10, at 4. 
162. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in 
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This Part discusses statutory crowdfunding legislation and regulation 
passed at the federal and state levels. The Part begins with a discussion 
of Title III of the JOBS Act, which allows companies to conduct small-
dollar offerings in a limited disclosure regime. It then uses three state-
level analogs to demonstrate the range of local alternatives: Indiana’s 
exemption, which allows issuers to raise up to $2 million; Maryland’s 
exemption, which limits issuers to $100,000; and a model act 
promulgated by the North American Securities Administrators 
Association (NASAA), an association of state securities administrators. 
A. Crowdfunding and the JOBS Act 
Signed into law in April of 2012, the JOBS Act was characterized as 
“attempt[ing] to create jobs by making it easier for America’s 
entrepreneurs to raise startup and growth capital.”163 Although the Act 
contains several provisions that concern relatively large private 
businesses, Title III focuses exclusively on allowing small issuers to 
conduct offerings over the internet.
164
 Known as the CROWDFUND 
Act,
165
 Title III adds an exempted transaction to the Securities Act in a 
newly created section 4(a)(6).
166
 
This exemption takes after traditional private crowdfunding platforms 
like Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and Kiva. Those websites and others connect 
entrepreneurs with anyone willing to receive an in-kind return, a gradual 
reimbursement of their original donation, or the satisfaction of 
supporting a cause in exchange for a small investment.
167
 Because the 
transactions on these websites do not involve a “security” as defined by 
various Supreme Court opinions,
168
 their activities are not covered by 
securities regulation. Until recently, however, both securities registration 
requirements and limitations on selling to unaccredited investors all but 
prohibited most investors from obtaining equity in non-public 
businesses.
169
 
                                                     
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
163. 158 CONG. REC. E517 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2012) (statement of Rep. McCollum). 
164. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act §§ 301–305, 126 Stat. at 315–23. 
165. An acronym for the Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-
Disclosure Act of 2012. 
166. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012). 
167. See Bradford, supra note 5, at 10–27 (discussing crowdfunding generally and listing five 
different varieties). 
168. See id. at 31–41 (discussing how each type of crowdfunding is treated under securities 
regulation). 
169. See id. at 24–27.  
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The Title III exemption was intended to pave the way for equity 
crowdfunding.
170
 One of the more novel elements of Title III is its 
express endorsement of the “funding portal,” an online tool that mimics 
the websites used by non-equity, web-based crowdfunding.
171
 Issuers 
that engage in equity crowdfunding must utilize an intermediary, in the 
form of either an online “funding portal” or broker, to facilitate the 
transaction.
172
 In part because these intermediaries function as a funnel 
for all potential crowdfunding offerings, Title III utilizes them as a 
source of investor protection and a prophylactic against fraud. Funding 
portals as an alternative intermediary to a broker is a new addition. 
Funding portals are exempted from broker-dealer registration 
requirements established by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act),
173
 but they must nonetheless register with the SEC and 
a self-regulatory organization (SRO).
174
 They must also comply with a 
series of statutory requirements: refrain from offering investment advice; 
avoid soliciting purchases, sales, or offers or securities; not compensate 
employees based on sale of securities on its website; not handle investor 
funds or securities; and follow other rules as determined by the SEC.
175
 
In addition, funding portals are required to help inform investors 
about the risks inherent in this type of investment
176
 and provide 
additional education materials.
177
 The SEC recognized the importance of 
                                                     
170. See 158 CONG. REC. S2230 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Brown) (“The 
CROWDFUND Act sets the framework for developing a new market in which entrepreneurs can 
raise capital and ordinary investors can invest in new ideas.”). 
171. A funding portal acts as an intermediary in a crowdfunding transaction but cannot do the 
following: 
(A) offer investment advice or recommendations; (B) solicit purchases, sales, or offers to buy 
the securities offered or displayed on its website or portal; (C) compensate employees, agents, 
or other persons for such solicitation or based on the sale of securities displayed or referenced 
on its website or portal; (D) hold, manage, possess, or otherwise handle investor funds or 
securities; or (E) engage in such other activities as the Commission, by rule, determines 
appropriate. 
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80). 
172. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(C). 
173. Id. § 78c(h)(1). 
174. Id. § 77d-1(a)(1), (2). Registered funding portals receive an exemption from the application 
of local legal requirements to the extent that those requirements are “in addition to or different from 
the requirements for registered funding portals established by the Commission.” Id. § 78o(i)(2)(B). 
Under its proposed rule, the SEC identified the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) as 
a particular self-regulatory organization that intermediaries could register with; that specific 
reference was removed in the final rule. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,429 (Nov. 16, 
2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, & 274). 
175. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80). 
176. Id. § 77d-1(a)(4). 
177. Id. § 77d-1(a)(3). 
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education as an investor protection tool.
178
 The agency supplemented the 
Act’s statutory language with specific requirements “relating to the risks 
of investing in securities offered and sold . . . , investors’ cancellation 
rights, resale restrictions and issuer reporting,” among others.179 The 
rules specify that individual intermediaries may determine the context of 
materials other than minimum requirements as well as the manner of 
presentation.
180
 Finally, intermediaries must gather information about 
issuers, including conducting background checks on an issuer’s officers, 
directors, and shareholders with a greater than twenty percent stake in 
the business.
181
 
Title III then continues with restrictions on issuers. Issuers are limited 
to raising a maximum of $1 million of securities within a twelve-month 
period.
182
 The SEC clarified in its final rule that this dollar figure will be 
based solely on offerings made in reliance on the crowdfunding 
exemption, despite the statutory language that the limit applies to the 
“aggregate amount sold to all investors by the issuer.”183 
All issuers must also provide basic information to potential 
investors.
184
 Importantly, disclosure requirements vary based on the 
amount an issuer wishes to raise: if the amount is less than $100,000, 
then the issuer’s income taxes for the most recent year as well as 
financial statements certified by the principal executive officer must be 
disclosed; if the amount is between $100,000 and $500,000, then 
financial statements must be reviewed by an independent accountant; if 
the amount is greater than $500,000, then audited financial statements 
must be disclosed.
185
 Finally, issuers cannot engage in any advertising 
                                                     
178. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,390 (including investor education among the protective 
functions that intermediaries serve). 
179. Id. at 71,439. 
180. Id. The SEC rejected some commenters’ suggestions for additional information, including 
materials about how to evaluate investment in privately held companies. Id. at 71,439–40. The SEC 
reasoned that, although helpful, it was not persuaded that such information “would significantly 
strengthen the investor protections” provided under the rules. Id. at 71,440. 
181. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(5). 
182. Id. § 77d(a)(6). 
183. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,391 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012)). 
184. This information includes: the names of the business’s officers, directors, and shareholders 
with over twenty percent interest, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(B), a description of its business along 
with a business plan, id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(C), a description of the intended use of the offering’s 
proceeds, id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(E), a description of the business’s ownership and capital structure, id. 
§ 77d-1(b)(1)(H), and at least annual financial statements to both investors and the SEC, id. § 77d-
1(b)(4). 
185. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D). 
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other than to point potential investors to the funding portal or broker.
186
 
Title III also attempts to protect investors by limiting their exposure 
to losses and empowering their ability to fight back against fraudulent 
issuers. Within a twelve month period, a single individual is limited to 
investing in one company either: (i) the greater of $2000 or five percent 
of their annual income or net worth if their income or net worth is less 
than $100,000; or (ii) ten percent of their annual income or net worth, up 
to $100,000, if their income or net worth exceeds $100,000.
187
 The Act 
also prohibits resale to anyone within one year after the date of purchase 
other than the issuer itself, accredited investors, family members, or as 
part of a registered offering.
188
 Investors are also able to bring their own 
claims against any issuer
189
 that makes a material untrue statement or 
omits a material fact during the offering or sale of a crowdfunding 
security.
190
 
Although Title III sets out more than a bare outline of legal 
requirements, it also directed the SEC to engage in supplementary 
rulemaking.
191
 That rulemaking—required to occur within 270 days after 
President Obama signed the JOBS Act,
192
 or by January 2013—lagged 
woefully behind schedule. The SEC did not issue a proposed rule until 
late 2013,
193
 and that proposal finally became official in October 
2015.
194
 This unanticipated delay prevented the creation of any funding 
portals or initiation of crowdfunding actions based on the federal 
exemption. 
B. State-Level Crowdfunding Response 
While federal regulators failed to take action, state legislators had 
begun to fill the void. Before Congress passed the JOBS Act, only two 
                                                     
186. Id. § 77d-1(b)(2). 
187. Id. § 77d(a)(6). 
188. Id. § 77d-1(e)(1). 
189. Defined as “any person who is a director or partner of the issuer, and the principal executive 
officer or officers, principal financial officer, and controller or principal accounting officer of the 
issuer . . . that offers or sells a security in a transaction exempted by the provisions of section 4(6).” 
Id. § 77d-1(c)(3). 
190. Id. § 77d-1(e)(2)(A). 
191. See, e.g., id. § 77d-1(a)(5) (requiring intermediaries to “take such measures to reduce the 
risk of fraud . . . as established by the Commission, by rule”); id. § 77d-1(b)(5) (requiring issuers to 
“comply with such other requirements as the Commission may, by rule, prescribe”). 
192. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(c), 126 Stat. 306, 320 
(2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
193. SEC Crowdfunding Proposal, supra note 20. 
194. SEC Crowdfunding Adoption, supra note 21. 
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states had enacted a crowdfunding law. On August 12, 2011 Kansas’s 
“Invest Kansas Exemption” became effective,195 which Georgia quickly 
followed with the “Invest Georgia Exemption,” effective December 8, 
2011.
196
 Since then, thirteen other states have passed an exemption, with 
legislation pending in at least twelve more.
197
 The result has been a 
patchwork of laws with varying disclosure requirements, caps on issuers 
and investors, and fit within the broader federal framework.
198
 
The benefit of this patchwork approach is in its diversity, which has 
allowed for greater experimentation.
199
 The synopses included below—
of crowdfunding laws passed in Indiana and Maryland, along with the 
Model Crowdfunding Exemption promulgated by the NASAA—
demonstrate the breadth of that diversity among several different criteria, 
including the use of an online intermediary, the amount issuers may raise 
in a single offering, and the amount investors may invest. 
1. The “Invest Indiana Crowdfunding Exemption” 
Indiana began allowing crowdfunding after it announced rules 
governing such offerings on July 1, 2014.
200
 Like the majority of state 
crowdfunding laws, Indiana’s relies on the intrastate exemption and thus 
requires all crowdfunding to take place within the state’s borders.201 
Indiana also requires the use of an internet portal.
202
 That portal must do 
one of the following: (1) refrain from taking an interest in the sale of 
posted offerings by not providing investment advice, soliciting 
purchases or sales of its posted offerings, or tying its own fees or its 
employees’ compensation to the amount of securities sold;203 or (2) 
register with either the state as a broker-dealer
204
 or the federal 
                                                     
195. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21 (2016). 
196. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2-.08 (2016). 
197. Zeoli, supra note 22. 
198. With respect to this last point, although a substantial majority of states base their blue sky 
crowdfunding law on section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act, Maine relies on Rule 504 of Regulation 
D. ME. STAT. tit. 32, § 16304 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.). Because so many 
states rely on the intrastate exemption, this Comment does not address Maine’s approach. 
199. See Soloman, supra note 26 (“The states that are filling the void are undertaking the great 
experiment that Congress should have required in the first place.”). 
200. Press Release, Office of the Indiana Secretary of State, Secretary of State Connie Lawson 
Implements Crowdfunding in Indiana (July 1, 2014), http://www.in.gov/sos/ 
securities/files/Crowdfunding_Rules_Press_Release_(7.1.14).pdf [https://perma.cc/AX5L-8X8B]. 
201. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.). 
202. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(O). 
203. Id. § 23-19-2-2.3(c). 
204. Id. § 23-19-2-2.3(b). 
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government as a broker-dealer or funding portal.
205
 
Like issuers in the federal scheme, issuers in the state program must 
disclose certain information to investors upfront
206
 and must make a 
notice filing and pay a filing fee to the state.
207
 Unlike the federal 
exemption and most other state exemptions, Indiana’s crowdfunding 
legislation allows an issuer to raise up to $2 million in a twelve-month 
period if that issuer provides each investor and the state’s commissioner 
with audited financial statements.
208
 Without audited statements, issuers 
are limited to raising $1 million.
209
 The duration and actual size of the 
offering is set based on the issuer’s election of a minimum dollar amount 
and a specified duration.
210
 While the offering takes place, the issuer 
must set up an escrow account with a third-party financial institution,
211
 
which will be the sole depository for investor funds if and until the 
offering reaches the minimum threshold amount.
212
 If the offering 
succeeds, the issuer must continue to provide investors with quarterly 
reports detailing executive compensation and the business’s operational 
and financial condition.
213
 
Indiana, of course, also protects investors. The law places a hard limit 
on all investments at $5000 per unaccredited investor per issuer, 
regardless of income, unless the investor is accredited.
214
 During the 
course of an offering prior to reaching the threshold minimum dollar 
amount, any investor may decide to cancel her investment.
215
 Finally, the 
statute does not comment on any resale restrictions. 
2. Maryland’s Crowdfunding Law 
On May 15, 2014, Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley signed that 
                                                     
205. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(O)(v); see 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1 (2012) (federal funding portal registration 
requirement); id. § 78o (federal broker-dealer registration requirement). 
206. Required disclosure includes descriptions of: the company and its business plan; the 
intended use of the offering’s proceeds; the identity of officers, directors, major shareholders; and 
the terms and conditions of the securities offered. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(L). 
207. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(F)(i). 
208. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(C)(ii). 
209. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(C)(i). 
210. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(H) . 
211. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(F)(iv). 
212. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(F)(v). Although this escrow requirement is not contained in the JOBS 
Act itself, the SEC’s rulemaking specifically requires creation of an escrow account. Crowdfunding, 
80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,449 (Nov. 16, 2015). 
213. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(P). 
214. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(E). 
215. Id. § 23-19-2-2(27)(F)(vi). 
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state’s crowdfunding law, the Maryland Intrastate Small Business 
Exemption.
216
 The statute itself, however, sets out only a skeletal 
framework. Like Indiana’s law, the Maryland exemption relies on the 
federal intrastate exemption.
217
 Most of the similarities between the 
states’ statutes end there. Neither Maryland’s statute nor the order 
promulgated by its Securities Division
218
 requires issuers to utilize an 
online portal or other intermediary. Maryland’s offering limit, 
$100,000,
219
 and its limit on how much purchasers may invest in a given 
offering, $100,
220
 are by far the lowest of any enacted or proposed state 
exemption.
221
 Particularly unusual is that the order limits offerings in 
Maryland to permanently nontransferable promissory notes,
222
 rather 
than equity interests.
223
 
The Securities Division’s supplemental materials provide a set 
number of additional requirements and limitations. All issuers must fill 
out a disclosure form containing basic, relatively limited information 
summarizing the nature of their business, the duration of the proposed 
offering, and the amount the issuer intends to raise.
224
 The Division also 
provides a form that each issuer must distribute to potential investors 
with information including a list of both generic and company-specific 
risk factors,
225
 a sheet detailing the intended use of the offering’s 
proceeds, and a description of the company’s directors and employees 
with a greater than ten percent interest in the company.
226
 The general 
nature of the information required in these disclosures makes them less 
burdensome than in other states,
227
 which is appropriate given the law’s 
lower per-company and per-investor ceilings. 
                                                     
216. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 11-601 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
217. Id. § 11-601(16)(i). 
218. IN THE MATTER OF: MARYLAND INTRASTATE SMALL BUSINESS EXEMPTION, MD. SEC. 
COMMISSIONER (2014) [hereinafter MARYLAND ORDER], http://www.oag.state.md.us/securities/ 
MISBEOrder.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKG8-JA3B]. 
219. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 11-601(16)(iii). 
220. Id. § 11-601(16)(iv). 
221. Cf. Zeoli, supra note 22. 
222. MARYLAND ORDER, supra note 218. 
223. Id. The order allows “[t]he Commissioner [to] extend by order the exemption under this 
regulation to other types of securities” consistent with the public interest. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Masai McDougall, Maryland Securities Commissioner Finalizes Rules for Intrastate 
Crowdfunding, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/ 
2014/10/53317-maryland-securities-commissioner-finalizes-rules-intrastate-crowdfunding/ 
[https://perma.cc/5M9J-DTL7]. 
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3. The Model Crowdfunding Exemption 
The NASAA began promoting a state-led effort to establish new 
crowdfunding rules prior to the passage of the JOBS Act.
228
 Although 
Congress clearly did not heed the organization’s suggestion that “states 
should be the primary regulator of small business capital formation, 
including crowdfunding offerings,”229 the NASAA nonetheless 
promulgated its own Model Crowdfunding Act to help guide state 
regulators.
230
 The Model Act uses some similar safeguards to the Indiana 
rule, but is significantly more cautious with regards to total offering 
amount and per-investor limits.
231
 
In many ways, the Model Act splits the difference between the 
Indiana and Maryland crowdfunding exemptions. Companies would be 
limited to raising $500,000 in any twelve-month period, and prior to 
beginning the offering must set a target amount and period.
232
 If the 
amount raised fails to reach the stated goal within the provided 
timeframe, all proceeds must be returned to the investors.
233
 Companies 
relying on the exemption must also notify their home state’s Securities 
Administrator that the offering is taking place and disclose basic, 
unaudited financial information prepared in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles.
234
 The Act limits individuals to $1000 
investments for any given company, and at any given time an individual 
may only invest up to $2000 if their annual income does not exceed 
$50,000, four percent of their annual income if they earn between 
$50,000 and $100,000, and eight percent for individuals whose earnings 
exceed $100,000.
235
 
Similar to Title III and Indiana’s exemption, the Model Act utilizes 
online intermediaries as a way to ensure issuer compliance and help 
facilitate investor protection. Companies cannot advertise any details of 
                                                     
228. William Beatty, Legislative Proposals to Enhance Capital Formation for Small and 
Emerging Growth Companies, Part II, NORTH AM. SEC. ADMINS. ASS’N, (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.nasaa.org/30660/legislative-proposals-enhance-capital-formation-small-emerging-
growth-companies-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/32KJ-2PLN]. 
229. Id. 
230. Model Crowdfunding Exemption, NORTH AM. SEC. ADMINS. ASS’N, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/wac6web/docs/NASAAmodel.html [https://perma.cc/BS96-BZWJ] (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2016). 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
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their offering other than to point potential investors to an intermediary’s 
website.
236
 Intermediaries must help protect investors by providing 
access to the company’s financial disclosures, informing investors that 
the entirety of their investment is subject to loss, and conducting 
background checks on all companies and company management.
237
 The 
Model Act also requires issuers to help ensure that per-investor limits 
are followed, for both individual offerings and for aggregate per-investor 
limits.
238
 
III. ANALYSIS OF CROWDFUNDING EXEMPTIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES 
State securities regulators are in an exceptionally good position to 
protect investors against abuses in the context of small-dollar 
offerings.
239
 In his recent written testimony before the House Committee 
on Financial Services, NASAA President William Beatty not only 
emphasized that “states have a more direct interest [than the federal 
government] in these offerings,” but continued on to warn that certain, 
more lenient crowdfunding provisions could “critically undermine the 
potential success of equity-based crowdfunding.”240 Mr. Beatty focused 
on several areas in particular: per-investor limits; issuer financial 
disclosure; civil liability for fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions; 
and maintenance of state-level protections.
241
 Under the logic of existing 
securities regulation, these types of protections are even more important 
in offerings directed at retail investors because those investors lack the 
sophistication to fully understand the investment or wherewithal to hire 
an expert. Investing in small businesses is a risk-laden proposition 
                                                     
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. Beatty, supra note 228. 
240. Id. Similar concerns were voiced in comments to the SEC’s proposed crowdfunding rules. 
See, e.g., Letter from Tom Quaadman, Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Feb. 3, 2014) https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-
13/s70913-216.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK2V-WKRN] (“While Crowdfunding will provide new 
opportunities for retail investors to engage with the capital markets, the [Chamber of Commerce] 
also believes that strong investor protections are needed to provide a level playing field grounded in 
certainty.”); Letter from William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Mass., to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Feb. 3, 2014) 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913-213.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G36-BFDJ] (“Because 
crowdfunding offerings will involve significant numbers of small and unsophisticated purchasers, it 
is crucial that the SEC’s crowdfunding rules protect vulnerable investors.”). 
241. See Beatty, supra note 228. 
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regardless of the context,
242
 but offerings conducted over the internet
243
 
and to inexperienced investors
244
 are even more fecund soils for fraud 
and loss.
245
 
Concerns about the downsides of reduced regulation must be 
balanced against the costs those regulations impose on businesses. 
Regulations make sense only where the harm they prevent is greater than 
the cost of compliance,
246
 and thus whether a particular provision is 
appropriate should account for both its cost and potential benefits.
247
 
Professor C. Steven Bradford attempted to balance these concerns in an 
article written prior to the passage of the JOBS Act.
248
 Although that 
discussion was in the context of federal crowdfunding regulation, many 
of those similar concerns apply to the state-level context as well, based 
on the similar goals of state and federal securities regulation—
encouraging capital formation while limiting investor harm. This Part 
frequently references Professor Bradford’s recommendations with 
respect to existing state crowdfunding exemptions and the new federal 
regulations, with a focus on the statutes discussed above. To that end, 
this final Part discusses each of the three parties to a crowdfunding 
offering—the issuer, the intermediary, and the investor—in the context 
of how each is, and should be, limited. 
                                                     
242. See Frequently Asked Questions, SMALL BUS. ASS’N (Mar. 2014), 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/FAQ_March_2014_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KP7-
CQCZ] (“About half of all new establishments survive five years or more and about one-third 
survive 10 years or more.”). 
243. Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL 
& EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 77–78 (1998) (“[T]he Internet may be less effective at selling securities 
because of consumer perception of risk, because of the absence of personalized marketing, and 
because it is difficult for consumers to evaluate and verify the quality of the information 
provided.”). 
244.  See Bradford, supra note 5, at 109–12 (suggesting that a substantial portion of the American 
public lacks financial literacy). 
245. See generally id. at 104–16 (2012) (elaborating on the potential risks to investors in the 
crowdfunding context based on problems of small business vulnerability and lack of investor 
sophistication).  
246. C. Steven Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 and the Case for an 
Unconditional Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 23 (2001) (“We should not pay a 
million dollars to prevent a thousand dollar loss. Registration should be required only when the 
expected gain from registration exceeds its expected cost.”). 
247. See id. at 23–29 (summarizing studies about the costs of registering a securities offering and 
offering some rationale for related benefits). 
248. Bradford, supra note 5, at 117. 
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A. Restrictions on Issuers 
An offering’s success begins and ends with the issuer. Because small 
business investments in particular raise concerns regarding fraud, self-
dealing, and vulnerability to market forces,
249
 certain precautions should 
be taken. These precautions are especially important when the investor 
base lacks the resources or sophistication to fully appreciate the nature 
of an investment. This Section discusses the two primary limits placed 
on issuers interested in crowdfunding—per-offering limits and 
disclosure requirements—as well as other important protections like the 
use of per-offering floors and escrow accounts. Following the reasoning 
argued by Professor Bradford,
250
 and the model adopted by the JOBS 
Act, the regulatory burden placed on issuers should track the total 
offering amount. 
The dangers of fraud and undue speculation increase in step with an 
offering’s size and the participating investors’ relative vulnerability.251 
Although the size of a crowdfunded offering is dwarfed by traditional 
initial public offerings (IPOs),
252
 limits to offering size can help reduce 
the chance for excessive investor losses. Currently, the most lenient 
jurisdictions limit their crowdfunding exemption to either $2 million, a 
threshold set by Indiana and several other states,
253
 or the outlier $4 
million allowed in Illinois.
254
 This higher limit contrasts with the 
$100,000 ceiling in Maryland and $250,000 in Oregon.
255
 
Of course, a specific dollar limit will always be somewhat arbitrary: 
any one threshold will always be more than some companies intend to 
raise and less than others need. More important than finding the best 
                                                     
249. See id. at 105–09. 
250. Id. at 142. 
251. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2016) (exempting offerings up to $1,000,000 to all investors 
regardless of whether they are accredited, sophisticated, or otherwise), with id. § 230.506 
(exempting an unlimited offering so long as investors are either accredited or sophisticated); see 
also infra Section III.C (discussing the vulnerability of and enacted protections for investors). 
252. The median IPOs for 2012, 2013, and 2014 were $94.3, $107.4, and $96.0 million 
respectively. WILMERHALE, 2015 IPO REPORT 2 (2015), https://www.wilmerhale.com/ 
uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/ 
Publications/Documents/2015-WilmerHale-IPO-Report.pdf.  
253. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(C)(ii) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.); 950 
MASS. CODE REGS. § 14.402(B)(13)(o)(4) (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.2202a(1)(c) 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.202(26)(c)(1) (West, Westlaw 
through 2015). 
254. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4(S)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
255. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 11-601(16)(iii) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.); OR. ADMIN. R. 441-035-0090 (2016). 
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ceiling is matching the regulatory burden placed on companies to the 
amount raised.
256
 Basic economics suggests that a law that regulates a 
company raising $50,000 to the same extent as one raising $1 million 
disproportionately burdens the smaller company.
257
 Federal lawmakers 
attempted to balance burdens and benefits by incorporating tiered 
disclosure requirements into the JOBS Act.
258
 Not so for all states. Some 
states that employ a tiered disclosure scheme have done so in a less 
granular fashion. Indiana drew a line at $1 million, with everything 
below that requiring unaudited financials and everything above requiring 
audited numbers.
259
 
B. Restrictions on Intermediaries 
The traditional, non-equity crowdfunding campaign is conducted 
through an online platform.
260
 The SEC has noted that a registered 
intermediary acts as “[o]ne of the key investor protections” used in the 
JOBS Act.
261
 Although the JOBS Act and many states envision 
channeling equity crowdfunding through online websites, such a 
requirement is far from uniform.
262
 States have addressed online 
crowdfunding portals in one of three ways: (i) specifying that all 
crowdfunded offerings must be conducted through such a platform; (ii) 
allowing, without requiring, offerings to be conducted online; or (iii) 
refraining from specifying one way or another. This Comment argues 
that required use of a portal is not only beneficial to businesses, but also 
                                                     
256. Bradford, supra note 5, at 118–20 (discussing how the ceiling on offerings under an 
exemption should be related to the total regulatory burden, and stating that a larger exemption 
“requires stronger assumptions about the cost of registration, the risk of loss, and the extent to 
which registration reduces that risk.”). 
257. See C. Steven Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933: An Economic 
Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591, 614–22 (1996) (examining the then-existing regulatory structure and 
intermediate disclosure requirements set forth by the SEC via Regulation D).  
258. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text. 
259. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text. Indiana’s Securities Division released 
temporary rules pursuant to the state’s statute, but those rules simply reference the statutory 
disclosure language without imposing additional requirements. IND. SEC. DIV., EMERGENCY RULE 
§ 5 (2015), http://www.in.gov/legislative/iac/20151216-IR-710150429ERA.xml.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/665X-3VKN]. 
260. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text (discussing non-equity crowdfunding 
websites). 
261. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,390 (Nov. 16, 2015). 
262. See supra note 171 (noting that the JOBS Act endorses online portals). Compare IND. CODE 
ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(O) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.) (requiring use of an online 
portal), with MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 11-601(16) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.) (not requiring use of an online portal). 
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protects investors. 
Because funding platforms run the risk of being seen as public 
solicitation, it is important to outline their legality before considering the 
benefits of a funding platform requirement. Federal securities 
exemptions begin with a baseline prohibition against all public 
solicitation in connection with an exempted offering.
263
 Under the theory 
that public solicitation would risk unnecessarily exciting investors, 
public advertisements and offers to investors are permitted only in 
registered, “public” offerings.264 This restriction was developed over 
time through judicial decision and SEC regulation to combat perceived 
dangers in public solicitation.
265
 Beginning with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in SEC v. Ralston Purina,
266
 courts attempted to look to the 
type of offerees at which solicitations were directed rather than examine 
the breadth of advertising.
267
 In principle, the SEC agreed that the 
determination of whether an offering should be public should be based 
on the extent of the offeree’s required knowledge and the offeree’s 
relationship with the issuer. The reality has been a general restriction on 
solicitation without regard to the type of advertising used or the danger 
posed.
268
 
Prior to the SEC’s recent crowdfunding regulations, online 
intermediaries occupied something of an uncomfortable middle ground. 
The Commission had allowed internet portals to operate without 
providing much clarity as to what constituted appropriate or 
inappropriate solicitation.
269
 Notwithstanding blurry lines at the margins 
                                                     
263. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2016) (prohibiting “general solicitation or general advertising” for 
offerings made pursuant Regulation D). 
264. See Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 2770 (Nov. 6, 1962) [hereinafter Private Offering Exemption], 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-4552.htm [https://perma.cc/W5BD-G6E8] (discussing the 
Ralston Purina decision and the SEC’s interpretation of what constitutes a public offering). 
265. See Stuart R. Cohn, Securities Markets for Small Issuers: The Barrier of Federal Solicitation 
and Advertising Prohibitions, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (1986) (discussing the development of the 
SEC’s prohibition on solicitation). 
266. 346 U.S. 119 (1953). 
267. Id. at 127 (“The focus of inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the protections 
afforded by registration.”); see Cohn, supra note 265, at 10. Wealthy investors or individuals with a 
particular expertise are excluded from these prohibitions. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. 
268. Compare Private Offering Exemption, supra note 264 (“[T]he number of persons to whom 
the offering is extended is relevant only to the question whether they have the requisite association 
with and knowledge of the issuer which make the exemption available.”), with Cohn, supra note 
265, at 11 (“[T]he SEC has succeeded in creating an impregnable rule against public solicitation 
which replaces a judgment based upon consideration of the circumstances of the case.”). 
269. Compare Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities Act Release No. 7233, 
1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 3200 (Oct. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Online Delivery Release] (“The 
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or in certain circumstances, restrictions on general solicitation apply to 
internet activity just like any other type of communication.
270
 
Accordingly, state crowdfunding laws and the SEC’s rules pursuant to 
the JOBS Act appropriately allow online platforms to operate in this 
space within certain limits. 
Under the federal law, funding portals are expressly regulated and 
allowed to replace traditional broker-dealers as intermediaries.
271
 In 
addition, the JOBS Act expressly preempts states from enacting more 
restrictive laws for funding portals registered with the SEC.
272
 Because 
the federal law preempts only those funding portals registered with the 
SEC, states would be free to enact more (or less) strict requirements for 
funding portals that engage in crowdfunding within that state alone.
 Indiana’s law, for example, requires that offers be “made 
exclusively through one (1) or more Internet web sites,”273 while the 
Model Rule states that “[a]ll offers and sales of securities in reliance 
upon this exemption shall be made through an intermediary’s 
website.”274 As discussed above,275 if an Indianan crowdfunding website 
is registered as a broker-dealer under the Exchange Act,
276
 if it is 
registered as a funding portal under the Securities Act, or if it meets 
specific criteria that track the federal portal requirements, it need not 
register with the state as a broker-dealer. State-level portal requirements 
are important despite the JOBS Act because businesses may look to take 
advantage of a state’s higher dollar threshold, like with Indiana’s $2 
million limit, or other unique features, like with Maryland’s law 
allowing for reduced reporting requirements. 
Even at the state level, a centralized online portal has several 
regulatory and capital-raising benefits. First, as an important aid for 
investor protection, online portals encourage transparency by facilitating 
                                                     
placing of the offering materials on the Internet would not be consistent with the prohibition against 
general solicitation or advertising in Rule 502(c) of Regulation D.”), with Bradford, supra note 5, at 
64–65 (citing examples of SEC no-action letters and stating that “the SEC staff has approved 
several web-based electronic matching systems”). 
270. See Online Delivery Release, supra note 269 (rejecting a hypothetical situation where a 
company makes common stock, sold in a private placement under Rule 506, available on an internet 
site to persons who first provide the company with certain information). 
271. See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text. 
272. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(2) (2012). 
273. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(O) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.).  
274. Model Crowdfunding Exemption, supra note 230. 
275. See supra notes 185–90 and accompanying text. 
276. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(O)(v); see also id. § 23-19-2-2.3. 
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communication between potential investors.
277
 The entire investor cohort 
will benefit from their collective ability to gather and share information 
with the group, allowing the knowledgeable to guide the uninformed.
278
 
The benefits of group intelligence have been well documented.
279
 
Crowds are often more effective than lone experts at making decisions, 
including in the context of business performance.
280
 Of course, this 
benefit comes with some baggage. For example, it is possible that some 
people will (and do) invest simply because they follow others who they 
presume have found a winner.
281
 This herd mentality is the type of 
problem initial blue sky laws attempted to address.
282
 
Furthermore, as the gatekeeper through which all issuers must pass, 
intermediaries can assist in identifying those issuers who provide reason 
for concern. For example, the final rules adopted by the SEC require an 
intermediary to reject issuers who the intermediary has “reasonable basis 
for believing” that the issuer or its officers would be subject to 
disqualification as bad actors.
283
 These prohibitions—similar to those 
under Rules 262 and 506
284—cover disqualifying events including, 
among other things, the issuer’s felony or misdemeanor convictions 
within the last five years and injunctions within the last five years as a 
                                                     
277. Bradford, supra note 5, at 134. 
278. Id. But see Fisch, supra note 243, at 77–79 (warning that differences between online and 
traditional IPOs give rise to concern, including the trouble investors have when information over the 
internet, the passive nature of internet offerings, and the lack of investment bankers to find and 
educate investors). 
279. See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 3–22 (2004) (discussing the 
benefits of group wisdom and citing several studies on the subject). Surowiecki, comparing the 
intelligence of a single expert against the wisdom of a large, diverse group, writes that “[w]e know 
that the group’s decision will consistently be better than most of the people in the group, and that it 
will be better decision after decision, while the performance of human experts will vary 
dramatically depending on the problem they’re asked to solve.” Id. at 34. 
280. Id. at 33–34 (2004) (citing an analysis by Wharton professor J. Scott Armstrong stating that 
“above a low level . . . ’expertise and accuracy are unrelated’”). 
281. In his book, Surowiecki discusses what economists call “information cascades,” where 
people look to others’ habits as a way to determine whether a course of action is legitimate or safe. 
See SUROWIECKI, supra note 279, at 50–63. Although potentially beneficial, information cascades 
can result in bubbles. Id. at 57. 
282. See supra notes 54–59. 
283. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,479 (Nov. 16, 2015). 
284. 17 C.F.R. § 230.262 (2016); id. § 230.506(d). These “bad actor” rules disqualify an issuer 
from conducting an offering in certain circumstances, including if the issuer or any directors, 
officers, or ten percent owners are subject to a criminal conviction or an injunction related to 
securities violations. See Process for Requesting Waivers of “Bad Actor” Disqualification Under 
Rule 262 of Regulation A and Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D, SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/262-505-waiver.htm [https://perma.cc/D5E3-
E5ME]. 
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result of a false filing with the SEC or other securities-related conduct.
285
 
Although many states have similar bad actor disqualifications, not even 
those who require internet portals use them to fulfill this function. For 
example, Indiana incorporates Rule 262 as its bad actor disqualifier, but 
simply says that its exemption “does not apply if an issuer or person 
affiliated with the issuer . . . is subject to disqualification . . . contained 
in . . . Rule 262.”286 Requiring intermediaries to help protect investors 
will save regulatory costs and encourage transparency. 
Second, using online portals can provide a platform through which 
smaller, less well-known businesses can access investors they would not 
have otherwise been able to reach.
287
 In a typical IPO, issuers receive 
help from underwriters or other parties familiar with the investment 
market.
288
 Although many sources of financing are available short of a 
full-scale offering,
289
 often small business owners lack the network and 
sophistication to market and sell their securities efficiently.
290
 Requiring, 
or merely allowing, use of an internet platform may help those 
businesses access a broader range of potential investors.
291
 
Finally, because online portals act as gatekeepers, they can be used as 
a means of educating investors. Federal lawmakers understood this. The 
JOBS Act requires intermediaries to provide “investor education 
materials,” and the SEC’s rulemaking reaffirmed the importance of 
investor education.
292
 Unfortunately, even those states that require 
offerings to pass through an online intermediary do not require those 
intermediaries to provide education materials.
293
 Without an online 
intermediary requirement, a means of educating potential investors in the 
same manner is much more difficult. 
                                                     
285. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,479–80. 
286. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(N) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.).  
287. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 11, at 931–32. 
288. Kurtis Urien & David Groshoff, An Essay Inquiry: Will the Jobs Act’s Transformative 
Regulatory Regime for Equity Offerings Cost Investment Bankers’ Jobs?, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 559, 
573 (2014); see WILLIAM M. PRIFTI, 1 SECURITIES PUB. & PRIV. OFFERINGS § 5:29 (2015) 
(describing the role of finders—parties “paid to find funding sources for companies or 
underwriters”—and their relationship to broker-dealer regulations specified in the securities laws). 
289. See generally John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A 
Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861 (2005) (describing different forms of debt and equity financing available to new 
businesses, including venture capital and angel investors). 
290. Campbell, supra note 112, at 89. 
291. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 11, at 931. 
292. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(3) (2012); see supra notes 176–80 and accompanying text. 
293. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(O) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. 
Sess.) (requiring use of an online intermediary but not mentioning provision of education materials). 
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C. Restrictions on Investors 
Investor protections imposed by current crowdfunding exemptions are 
as disparate as issuer limitations. Several states, including Maryland and 
Indiana, have instituted an absolute ceiling on the amount an investor 
may contribute to any single offering.
294
 Although ceiling benefits from 
simplicity, it does nothing to tailor how much an individual can invest to 
how much they could afford to lose.
295
 Indeed, a loss equal to the total 
investment amount allowed by some state laws could be potentially 
devastating.
296
 In contrast, other states use a “greater of” system like 
Washington State, limiting investors to the greater of an income 
percentage or a dollar amount.
297
 By linking per-investment limits to an 
investor’s income, the Washington version creates a ceiling more 
attuned to what an investor can afford to lose. 
Another distinguishing factor among states is whether the cap applies 
to how much an individual can invest in different offerings. For 
example, even though Indiana requires that an “issuer [can] not accept 
more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) from any single purchaser 
unless the purchaser is an accredited investor,”298 the statute is silent on 
whether a single individual could repeatedly invest $5000 with any 
number of different companies. By comparison, Washington State 
expressly limits “[t]he aggregate amount sold to any investor by one or 
more issuers during the twelve-month period preceding the date of the 
sale”299 to the amount discussed above. In effect, an Indiana investor 
                                                     
294. E.g. ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Second Spec. Sess.) 
($5000 limit for unaccredited investors); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(E) (same); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 44-1844 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.) ($10,000 limit for 
unaccredited investors); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-5-2-.08 (2016) (same); MD. CODE ANN., 
CORPS. & ASS’NS § 11-601(16)(iv) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) ($100 limit for all 
investors). 
295. Bradford, supra note 5, at 127. 
296. See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2-.08 (limiting all unaccredited investors to 
$10,000). 
297. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.880 (2016) (limiting investors with annual income less than 
$100,000 to the greater of $2000 or five percent of their income and investors with annual income 
over $100,000 to the lesser of $100,000 or ten percent of their income); see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 517.0611 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.) (limiting investors with annual 
income or net worth less than $100,000 to the greater of $2000 or five percent of annual income or 
net worth and if income or net worth over $100,000 then to the lesser of $100,000 or ten percent of 
income or net worth). 
298. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2(27)(E). 
299. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.880(1)(g). Even some tiered investor limits seem potentially 
troublesome. Washington, D.C., sets a cap of $10,000 for anyone with an income of less than 
$100,000 and $25,000 for anyone who makes less than $200,000. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 26-B, 
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with a $40,000 income could invest $5000 as many times as he wanted, 
while a similarly situated Washington investor would be limited to 
investing her pot of $2000 in one company or spreading it among 
several. 
Of course, these differing approaches present benefits and drawbacks. 
First, a per-investment limit would be most effective if directly tailored 
to the investor’s individual circumstances; a limit as a percentage of 
income serves as a more efficient proxy.
300
 Even though a percentage-of-
income limit is more difficult to administer than a flat amount in that it 
requires either verification or self-certification, that difficulty is justified 
as a means of protecting investors.
301
 Furthermore, a tailored limit 
promotes policy goals expressed through securities regulation in other 
areas: the JOBS Act itself applies a “percentage of” ceiling.302 
Second, if the goal of a per-investor limit is to protect unsophisticated 
investors from too much exposure, then investors should be limited in 
the total amount they can invest per year, not simply per company.
303
 In 
its comments that accompanied the SEC’s final crowdfunding rules, the 
Commission noted the importance of “minimizing an investor’s 
exposure to risk in a crowdfunding transaction” through conservative 
investment limits.
304
 Although a per-year limit could potentially result in 
fewer dollars flowing to startups, the lack of any annual limit fails to 
protect against investor injury.
305
 
CONCLUSION 
The SEC’s slow response in implementing crowdfunding provisions 
pursuant to the JOBS Act helped initiate a wave of state-level 
legislation. This piecemeal approach has created an opportunity for 
different jurisdictions to experiment with a wide variety of regulatory 
schemes. Based on a review of these laws in the context of historical 
                                                     
§ 250.2(c)(i) (2016). 
300. See Bradford, supra note 5, at 127–30. 
301. See id. 
302. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
303. See Bradford, supra note 5, at 126–31 (discussing the various forms an investment cap could 
take and arguing for an annual limit). 
304. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,394 (Nov. 16, 2015). The SEC interpreted an 
ambiguity in the JOBS Act’s language that applied limits “if either the annual income or the net 
worth of the investor is less than $100,000.” 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(i) (2012). The SEC 
resolved the ambiguity—a lack of specificity about what to do when either income or net worth was 
less than $100,000—by applying a “lesser of” test. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,394.  
305. See Bradford, supra note 5, at 131. 
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securities exemptions, there are some precautions states can and should 
take in order to protect small-dollar investors. The measures specifically 
advocated for in this Comment include tiered disclosure requirements 
that increase to match the offering size, scaled per-investor limits that 
place a ceiling on how much any one individual can invest, required use 
of online portals, and limitation of solicitation throughout the offering. 
Whatever limitations are put in place, the SEC’s overarching goals 
should remain paramount: protecting investors, maintaining efficient 
markets, and facilitating capital formation. In the crowdfunding context, 
that means balancing “exciting new opportunities for small businesses 
and startups”306 against President Roosevelt’s admonition that securities 
sales “shall be accompanied by full publicity and information.”307 As 
states continue to encourage small business investment and pass this 
newest type of “blue sky” law, the best reminder might be the term’s 
namesake: “an investment opportunity in which the promoter promises 
rain but delivers blue sky.”308 
                                                     
306. Press Release, Jeff Merkley, supra note 16. 
307. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933). 
308. Fleming, supra note 42, at 586. 
